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Introduction
The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities involves normative as well as practical challenges.
To motivate effective action to deter or halt mass killings of civilians, it is first necessary to persuade
the relevant actors of the legitimacy and necessity of such a policy. The struggle to implement robust
atrocity prevention measures is often lost at the normative level. Key government decision-makers
may decide that the prevention of atrocities is peripheral, or even antithetical, to “core national
security interests.”1 Conversely, when the United States or other great powers do intervene to
protect civilians, they may arouse suspicion from other parties. As the Albright-Cohen Genocide
Prevention Task Force observed in 2008, many governments “regard assertive U.S. policies as
ultimately self-interested, even or perhaps especially when framed in terms of humanitarian
purposes.”2
Comprising fifty-seven participating States “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,”3 the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a particularly salient case
study of the normative dimension of atrocity prevention efforts. The OSCE is the successor to the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), established by the Helsinki Final Act
of 1975 with the goal of finding “common ground through a process of dialogue, norm-setting, and
consensus” among the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The CSCE was “designed
as a process, with an informal structure that could provide flexibility” in promoting “common and
comprehensive” security.4 In the words of former OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Höynck, “[T]
he Final Act affirmed that the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential
factor for the peace, justice, and well-being, necessary to ensure the development of friendly
relations and cooperation.”5
The end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes both to the structure and mission of
the CSCE. Between 1990 and 1992, the organization established a formal institutional structure
including a Secretariat, a Permanent Council of ambassadors from all participating States, the
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the Office for Free Elections (later to become the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR), the Forum for Security Co-operation, and
the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).6 In 1995, the CSCE was
renamed the OSCE, reflecting this formalization of its institutional structure.
With an annual operating budget for 2017 of EUR 139 million (including EUR 4.7 million for
Conflict Prevention and EUR 3.4 million for the HCNM), the OSCE has been described as a “flea”
in comparison to the “elephant” of the European Union (EU), whose 2017 budget was more than
a thousand times larger.7 Despite its limited resources and lack of coercive power, the OSCE has
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played a critical role in preventing or containing violence against civilians in numerous regions of
Europe and Central Asia. As Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell argued in a 1999 essay, the CSCE/
OSCE mechanisms for preventive diplomacy
have proven to be the real workhorses of the international community in its attempts to
control substate conflict in post-Cold War Europe…. CSCE mechanisms have been involved
in managing far more potential substate conflict situations that either [NATO or the EU]…
Moreover, nearly all of these missions involved circumstances where it would have been
impossible for states to have used either of the other two institutions for collective intervention,
because neither had been endowed with the instruments to deal with prevailing conditions.8

In recent years, however, some observers have questioned the effectiveness of the OSCE’s
work, remarking on the “growing futility”9 of the OSCE as the EU has expanded its political and
security-related missions. During the Cold War, a clear demarcation existed between the structure
and function of the European Economic Community (EEC) and that of the CSCE: the EEC was a
regional organization focusing on the economic integration of Western Europe, whereas the CSCE
was an informal dialogue process promoting cooperative security measures between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. In 1993, the EEC was subsumed under the EU, which had a more comprehensive
mission including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over the past quarter-century, a
“functional convergence” has occurred between the EU and OSCE. Not only has the EU expanded
eastward into the former Warsaw Pact region, it has increasingly taken on political and security
functions, such as election monitoring and security sector reform, that had previously been the
province of the OSCE.10 The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU has also put the Russian
Federation on the defensive. Russian leaders have argued that “instead of acting as a genuine
transatlantic organization, the OSCE has evolved into an institution that seeks to act as a tool of
Western influence, pushing forward an agenda of excessive intrusion and potential destabilization
in Russia’s neighborhood.”11 As long ago as 2006, one expert asserted: “The OSCE is in crisis. . . .
There can be no doubt but that the OSCE today, as compared to its heyday during the Cold War, is
a far less visible landmark on the European institutional landscape than was formerly the case.”12
This essay will argue that the OSCE continues to play a unique and vital role in preventing and
containing ethnic conflict in Europe and Central Asia, but that its greatest distinctive strength—
the capacity to help foster shared political norms supporting “common and comprehensive
security”—has eroded since the late 1990s. Part I of the essay will discuss the original operating
concept of the CSCE and OSCE, which sought to constitute a cooperative transatlantic security
community through the promulgation of shared norms. Part II will examine the erosion of the
normative consensus between the Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE since the
late 1990s, focusing on some Eastern states’ distrust for the Western democracy promotion agenda.
Finally, Part III will examine the prospects for a more robust role of the OSCE in protecting civilians
from violent conflict and mass atrocities, given the increasing tensions among Eastern and Western
OSCE participating States in recent years.
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The OSCE Ideal: Community Building Through Norm Formation
Emanuel Adler has evocatively termed the OSCE an “imagined security community,” describing
the logic of the organization’s founders as follows:
[T]he OSCE has adopted the view that you must first let the largest number of people from
different states imagine that they are part of a community; only then, when all have formally
and instrumentally accepted the institution’s shared normative structures and practices, do
you socialize their elites and peoples by means of continual diplomatic interaction and a
wide range of community-building practices.13

Adler’s description of the OSCE community-building enterprise points to the power of norms not
only to constrain or regulate behavior but also to constitute new communal identities:
When assessing and measuring the influence of OSCE’s practices, we cannot simply look at
this institution’s regulative tasks or short-range activities, because what matters most is the
long-range effectiveness of its practices and activities as constitutive of community identity
and bonds . . . [W]hat matters most is not the short-range success of the mission, seminar,
or inspection, but the construction of a foundation for community practice and behavior.14

Although it might be tempting to dismiss the OSCE’s “seminar diplomacy” as an elaborate
sleight of hand, conjuring the illusion of a transatlantic community that remains purely imaginary,
this would ignore the real historical impact of the CSCE/OSCE enterprise. During the 1970s and
1980s, the Helsinki Process created a space for the articulation of human rights claims by dissident
groups in the Warsaw Pact, which played a role in facilitating a peaceful end to the Cold War. Since
the early 1990s, the HCNM and other OSCE institutions have sought to foster “an environment
characterized by shared meanings, trust, increased cooperation, and a sense of common identity.”15
For all the frustrations and setbacks involved in this project, there have also been important
successes.
Of the various component institutions of the OSCE, two are particularly relevant to the mission
of atrocity prevention: the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), along with the field operations that it
supports, and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). These will be
the focus of analysis for this paper.
Created in 1990, the CPC “acts as an OSCE-wide early warning focal point, facilitates
negotiation, mediation, and other conflict prevention and resolution efforts, and supports regional
co-operation initiatives.”16 In its initial years, the CPC focused principally on reducing risks of
interstate conflict among the OSCE participating States, for example by promoting Confidence and
Security Building Measures such as exchange of military information.
Over the past two decades, the mandate of the CPC has expanded to include early warning,
situation monitoring, mediation and dialogue facilitation, and support for OSCE field operations,
among other roles. It supports mediation initiatives in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria,
and Georgia.17 The OSCE also currently deploys sixteen field operations in South-Eastern Europe,
Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, addressing issues including reconciliation
and human rights protection in the Balkan states, conflict monitoring in Ukraine, and the monitoring
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and prevention of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan.18
The HCNM, which was created in 1992 in response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, has
played the most robust role within the OSCE in the prevention of mass atrocities and other forms of
ethnic conflict. In the 1990s alone, the HCNM was involved in mediations in thirteen states, and the
OSCE deployed thirteen missions of long duration in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central
Asia.19 OSCE interventions helped prevent conflict or defuse political crises in Estonia, Latvia, the
Crimea, and Albania. In other regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova, the OSCE
was unable to facilitate negotiated settlements to the conflicts. Nonetheless, even there its missions
may have “made important contributions by keeping negotiations open and by preserving the
cease-fires that… prevented large-scale violence from reappearing.”20 In recent years, the HCNM
has continued its intensive and wide-ranging activities. In May 2016, High Commissioner Astrid
Thors reported that over the past six months, she had traveled to ten countries—Kyrgyzstan,
Serbia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and
Macedonia—for consultations on issues related to national minorities.21
According to the 1992 Helsinki Document, the HCNM was intended to “be an instrument of
conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.” The office’s mandate was described as follows:
The High Commissioner will provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action”
at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which
have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High
Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting
peace, stability or relations between participating States.22

Under the mandate established by the Helsinki Document, the HCNM has the authority to
act independently, without approval either from other OSCE authorities or from the concerned
state, in order to address situations involving national minorities that have the potential to
escalate into violence. Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch foreign minister who served as the first
High Commissioner, has described the HCNM as “an independent, nonstate entity but with the
political support of member-states… This depoliticized, multilateral approach allows the High
Commissioner to employ cooperative, noncoercive problem-solving techniques…”23
In describing the early work of the HCNM in preventing ethnic violence in post-Cold War
Europe, Van der Stoel emphasized the normative foundations of his office’s authority. In a 1999
article, he asserted that
the HCNM’s independence follows naturally from the logic of international public interest
that underlies the concept of comprehensive security. Indeed, I believe it is now well
established that the multilateralism that created and sustains the HCNM offers opportunities
to address highly charged and potentially violent situations in a somewhat depoliticized
manner—at least at arm’s length through an impartial intermediary.24
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Although van der Stoel saw the HCNM’s independence as a critical prerequisite for its success, he
also stressed that the High Commissioner “could not function properly without the political support
of the participating States.”25 He declared:
Durable solutions are possible only if there is a sufficient measure of goodwill and consent
from the parties directly involved. I always endeavor to find such solutions and to bring
the parties to a consensus. I always try to find mutually agreeable solutions and to offer my
assistance in implementing measures. I am there to assist OSCE participating States that are
experiencing difficulties, and I work together with the parties on the basis of their good faith
and their mutual interest in settling difficulties with a view to enjoying a more peaceful and
prosperous life together.26

Thus, for example, he stressed that “the protection of persons belonging to national minorities has
to be seen as essentially in the interest of the state”; and conversely, that “solutions that allow for
the full realization of the aspirations of persons belonging to minorities should be sought as much
as possible within the framework of the state itself.”27
Van der Stoel was careful to emphasize the convergence of shared values and interests that
motivated the members of the OSCE community. This convergence was emphasized by the
very blandness of his own professional title: he was not the “High Commissioner for National
Minorities”—an advocate or ombudsman for threatened ethnic groups—but rather the “High
Commissioner on National Minorities,” charged with preventing and managing substate conflicts
related to minority rights.
From the outset of the Helsinki Process, there have been normative tensions within the OSCE
community-building enterprise. The Helsinki Final Act recognized not only the inviolability of
European borders but also the principle of self-determination—which had the potential to redraw
borders. Likewise, it asserted the principle of noninterference in states’ internal affairs while
also guaranteeing respect for human rights—which legitimated human rights monitoring of the
Warsaw Pact states. In addressing conflicts over minority rights, the OSCE has emphasized the
importance of resolving such conflicts without disrupting existing borders. In OSCE practice, write
Flynn and Farrell,
The norm of self-determination was not only subordinated to the norm of inviolability of
borders; it was also effectively removed as an independent principle of international relations
in Europe separable from the norm of democracy. Self-determination was to be directly and
exclusively related to creating political institutions that would protect cultural and ethnic
differences within common frameworks, rather than using these differences as a basis in
themselves for separation.28

In the next section, we will examine several case studies that illustrate how the normative authority
of the OSCE has played a role in preventing or containing ethnic violence in Europe and Central
Asia, as well as how that authority has eroded since the late 1990s.
Case Studies: The Declining Normative Authority of the OSCE
Although the OSCE’s mandate contains no formal provision referring to the prevention of genocide
or mass atrocities, several of its diplomatic interventions during the 1990s played an important
role in defusing crises that had the potential to result in large-scale violence against civilians. Its
efforts were generally more effective in regions that had not yet reached the boiling point—such as

25
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Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea—than in active conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, or NagornoKarabakh.
After the Soviet Union annexed Estonia and Latvia in 1940, significant Soviet military bases
were established in both republics, and large numbers of ethnic Russians moved into the region.
By 1989, a third of the population of Estonia and 42 percent of the population of Latvia consisted
of Russians and other Slavic nationalities. When the Baltic states achieved their independence in
1991, tensions intensified between the Baltic and Slavic ethnic groups, particularly in Estonia and
Latvia. Ethnic Estonians and Latvians, resenting the half-century-long Soviet “occupation” and
the accompanying suppression of their national languages and cultures, denied citizenship rights
to ethnic Russians who had entered the country after 1940. The countries’ Russian minorities,
many of whom had supported independence, felt betrayed by the restrictive citizenship laws. The
Russian government weighed in by vocally supporting the Russian minorities; and, in October
1992, it suspended the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Baltics, citing its concern
for the violation of Russian minority rights. Outside observers grew concerned that Russia might
capitalize on the crisis to justify military intervention in the Baltic states.29
The OSCE’s conciliation efforts between the Baltic governments and their Russian minorities
included the establishment of missions of long duration in Estonia (1992-2001) and Latvia (19932001), along with numerous visits by the HCNM, Max Van der Stoel. The OSCE missions steered
clear of recommending wholesale revisions to the countries’ restrictive citizenship laws, but
encouraged them to implement the laws with greater lenience and to make it easier for members of
minority groups to pass the citizenship tests, for example by expanding access to language classes
to enable Russian speakers to pass language exams. At the same time, the missions consulted
extensively with the leaders of the minority communities in both countries, urging them to accept
and cooperate with the national governments, rather than taking destabilizing actions that might
have provoked Russian military intervention.30
The Crimean Peninsula, whose population was about 67 percent ethnic Russian, had been
transferred as a “gift” to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. The
issue of the Crimeans’ national identity became salient only after 1991, when Ukraine achieved
independence. When a nationalist Russian was elected the first president of Crimea in 1994, he
proposed secession from Ukraine, provoking a political crisis. As in Estonia and Latvia, the OSCE’s
intervention involved the establishment of a mission of long duration (1994-1999) and a series of
visits by the HCNM. Van der Stoel’s office also organized several conferences and seminars that
successfully sought to harmonize the constitutions of Crimea and Ukraine, establishing a special
status for Crimea as an autonomous region within Ukraine.31
In describing the OSCE’s approach to addressing the crises in Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea,
Terrence Hopmann observes:
Issues of identity are virtually impossible to settle through negotiations based on a traditional
bargaining process. Instead, they require what has become known as a problem-solving
approach to negotiations. This negotiation process prescribes a number of negotiating
behaviors that are quite different from traditional, confrontational bargaining. The parties
should approach the conflict as a problem to be solved jointly rather than as a conflict to be
“won.” They should treat the dispute essentially as a “non-zero-sum” game, in which both
parties stand to lose from escalation while both may gain from mutual accommodation.32

Several features of the geopolitical context of these conflicts were favorable to this
problem-solving approach. The Russian government of Boris Yeltsin actively supported the
29
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OSCE’s diplomatic engagement in Estonia and Latvia, because Yeltsin saw the missions as
a means of protecting the rights of Russian minorities in both countries while defending his
credibility against his own nationalist domestic critics. Government officials in Estonia, Latvia,
and Ukraine, by contrast, viewed the OSCE’s involvement as a means of strengthening their
countries’ ties to the West and breaking their dependence on Russia. These governments’
desire to join the EU provided leverage to OSCE mediators, who were able to sustain their
conflict prevention efforts even in the face of staunch criticism from nationalist leaders in
the Baltics, who denied that there was any conflict to prevent. Finally, the United States was
itself able to exercise coercive leverage on behalf of the OSCE’s efforts: in 1994, the U.S. Senate
voted to suspend all aid to Russia until it completed the withdrawal of its military forces from
Estonia.33
Since the late 1990s, however, the OSCE has rarely been able to rely on such a supportive context
for its mediation efforts. For example, the carrot of potential EU membership, which provided a
powerful motivation for leaders of the Baltic states, has not been available to bolster mediation
efforts in Central Asia or the Caucasus. To the contrary, writes one commentator, the presence
of an OSCE mission “is often unfavorably perceived as an indication of an unstable area, thereby
warding off necessary foreign investment and weakening the country’s economic development in
these areas.”34
A greater challenge to the OSCE collaborative problem-solving efforts has been the rising
tension between Russia and the West. During the early 1990s, Yeltsin and other Russian leaders
embraced the organization as the potential centerpiece for a future collaborative European security
architecture. In subsequent years, however, the Western participating States placed increasing
emphasis on expanding NATO and the EU, to the detriment of the OSCE. The expansion of
NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, and an additional seven
states including the Baltic republics in 2004, drove home the view among Russian leaders that the
OSCE was “erecting a wall within itself, artificially dividing its members into the NATO and EU
members, and the rest.” Under these new conditions, declared Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, “NATO deals with security issues, the EU with economic issues, while the OSCE will only
monitor the adoption of these organizations’ values by countries that have remained outside the
EU and NATO.”35
In the late 1990s, Western criticisms of Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, along with
Russian unhappiness over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, created further frictions, which
intensified after the election of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in 2000.
Russia’s leaders increasingly expressed suspicions that the OSCE agenda was “destabilizing its
neighborhood and in the long run potentially also Russia itself.”36 They were particularly unhappy
with the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which they
saw as “regionally biased against the East.”37 Beginning in 2002, Russia sent its own observers to
monitor elections in the post-Soviet states, alongside monitors from the OSCE and EU, in order
to counter the “Western bias” in ODIHR’s conclusions. On Russia’s insistence, the OSCE also
sent observers to monitor elections in Western participating States, including Canada and the
United States.38 Russian leaders accused the OSCE of being a tool of Western interests in Ukraine
both during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and during the political crisis of 2014, and bridled at
ODIHR’s repeated criticisms of election irregularities in Belarus. Unnamed Western states, claimed
33
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Putin in 2007, were “trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote
the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”39
Over the past decade, the OSCE has been largely stalemated in its efforts to resolve many
protracted conflicts on the periphery of the Russian Federation, including Nagorno-Karabakh, South
Ossetia, and Transdniestria; and it has struggled to respond to Russia’s military interventions in
Georgia and Ukraine. In dealing with the crisis in Syria since 2011, the OSCE’s response has largely
been confined to a few statements addressing the refugee crisis. Syria is not a state partner of the
OSCE, so the organization has no official mandate vis-à-vis events in that country. Moreover, as
Alice Ackermann points out, the EU and OSCE sometimes establish an informal “division of labor”
in their efforts: for example, the OSCE has taken the lead role in addressing the conflict in Ukraine,
while the EU and UN have played more prominent roles with respect to Syria.40 Nonetheless, given
the profound implications of the Syrian civil war for international security within the boundaries
of both Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE, a more robust joint response would
have been desirable.41
The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention
In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE
as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of
geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by
global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and
the effects of climate change. Zannier observed:
As the OSCE was built in a divided environment to bridge the gulf between opposing sides,
today the convergence of all these problems is eroding the effectiveness of the tools that
were created at that time. So we are facing a situation where we may have more division,
and the tools that we developed to address the problems coming with the divisions are not
functioning… as well as they were. So engagement, creating a space of dialogue in spite of
the differences and the bitter debates… remains the key task for all of us.42

In the bitter aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where the Russian
intelligence services allegedly sought to undermine the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton in order to tip the result to Republican candidate Donald Trump, such constructive
dialogue has become more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Having
long complained of Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” through democracy promotion
initiatives and support for the “Color Revolutions,” the Putin regime has effectively turned
the tables on its Western counterparts. Russia is alleged to have “cultivated an opaque web of
economic and political patronage” throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe,43 as well
as to have forged connections with right-wing parties in Western Europe including the UKIP in
Britain and the National Front in France.44 The heated accusations of ill will on both sides have
further narrowed the already constricted avenues for cooperation between the OSCE’s Eastern and
Western participating States.
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As one scholar has written, the OSCE is “par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with
extremely few material resources at its disposal.” Unlike other regional organizations such as
the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot exercise coercive power by imposing economic sanctions or
threatening the use of military force. Nor, in the current geopolitical environment, can it credibly
offer material rewards such as the prospect of EU membership, which served as a powerful incentive
for cooperation by the Baltic governments in the 1990s. The effectiveness of the OSCE depends on
its ability to “use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural
capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power.”45
In the current polarized international security environment in Eurasia, it is increasingly
difficult for the OSCE to assert universally recognized moral authority. During the 1970s and 1980s,
the CSCE took shape as a dialogue process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a period of high
international tension and distrust, which eased temporarily during the decade after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. To some degree, the rising frictions between the Russian Federation and its Western
counterparts have returned Europe full circle to the geopolitical atmosphere that surrounded the
CSCE’s founding.
Even in an inhospitable geopolitical context, the OSCE can make several valuable
contributions to protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict in Eurasia: conflict prevention,
crisis management, cooperative problem-solving, and the promotion of norms favoring peaceful
coexistence of diverse ethnic and national groups. The remainder of this essay will address each of
these aspects of the OSCE’s work in turn.
Conflict Prevention. During the recent period of rising tensions between the Eastern and
Western factions of the OSCE, a number of efforts have been made to bridge this geopolitical
divide and develop more constructive strategies for mitigating threats of violent conflict. In
2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a
new European security dialogue to discuss post-Cold War security arrangements.46 In 2009, the
Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE launched a series of dialogues known as the “Corfu Process,”
which sought “to strengthen the Organization’s responsiveness to conflict in all its phases,”
including “early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and postconflict rehabilitation.”47 These dialogues culminated in 2011, under the OSCE’s Lithuanian
Chairmanship, in Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, which affirmed
“the Organization’s commitment to revisiting its approaches to conflict prevention and conflict
resolution for the twenty-first century.”48 Among other things, Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 called
for the establishment of a systematic conflict early warning system and a more robust mediationsupport capacity. Unfortunately, there has been limited practical follow-through on many of its
recommendations.49
Crisis Management. Some of the most intractable conflicts in the OSCE region—e.g. those
in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in areas on the
periphery of the Russian Federation where Russia has a strong vested interest in the outcome.
Given the OSCE’s lack of material instruments of leverage, the organization is unlikely to be able
to successfully mediate such conflicts that have become locked into a “security competition”
frame. Nonetheless, it can help contain violence by focusing international attention on events in
the conflict zones, monitoring developments, and providing early warning of potential escalation.
The presence of an OSCE field mission or visits by the HCNM may also provide channels of
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communication between leaders of rival groups, which may help keep a lid on violence even in the
absence of a formal settlement.
In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has tracked the
living conditions of the 1.8 million IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, offering
recommendations for how the government of Ukraine and international donors can meet the
needs of IDPs and enhance relations between IDPs and host communities.50 The SMM issues daily
spot reports on security conditions in Eastern Ukraine, monitoring compliance with the Minsk
ceasefire agreements, and “engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, ethnic and
religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground.”51 Astrid Thors, who
served as High Commissioner on National Minorities from 2013 through 2016, also engaged
in efforts to “facilitate a dialogue between national minorities and the Ukrainian authorities
on issues of common concern.” For example, she co-hosted a 2016 roundtable in Kyiv on
“Strengthening the Institutional Framework Related to Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine in
the Context of Decentralization.” Asserting that “improved policies in the field of inter-ethnic
relations would help to consolidate Ukrainian society and would increase stability in the country
as a whole,” the HCNM has worked to provide a platform for Russian and other minority
communities in Ukraine to express concerns about the protection of their language and cultural
identities.52
In less geopolitically sensitive regions, such as Central Asia and the Balkan states, the OSCE
may have greater potential for robust conflict prevention and crisis response—but its record
in achieving this potential has been uneven. For example, in May and June 2010, HCNM Knut
Vollebaek issued urgent warnings to the OSCE Permanent Council on the risk of interethnic violence
in Kyrgyzstan, asserting that the situation represented “one of the OSCE’s biggest challenges since
the 2008 war in the Caucasus.”53 When violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in
southern Kyrgyzstan that June, however, the OSCE Permanent Council displayed no appetite for a
robust response. In the words of one commentator, “The lack of collective will by the participating
States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in managing the
conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for maneuver.”54
Cooperative Problem-Solving. Even in geopolitically contested settings where a comprehensive
settlement remains elusive, the OSCE may be able to promote incremental progress toward peaceful
coexistence of rival groups. For example, in Georgia, where the OSCE field mission was closed
down on Russia’s insistence in 2008, the HCNM has “encouraged the effective implementation
of the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration for 2015-2020 and Its Action Plan,” and
has “continued to support a project to facilitate interaction between the political parties in the
country and national minority representatives, including by bringing them together to discuss
topical issues on televised talk shows.”55 In Moldova, High Commissioner Thors worked with
the parliament to establish a “joint working group with members of parliament and the People’s
Assembly of Gagauzia” to improve “the functioning of the Gagauz autonomy,” and she has worked
with the OSCE Mission to Moldova to address cultural and linguistic issues surrounding the
status of Transdniestria.56 Thors also remained engaged in addressing issues related to citizenship
rights, political representation of ethnic minorities, and protection of minority languages in a wide
50
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range of other countries including Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia,
Hungary, and Slovakia.57
Norm Promotion. Over the past twenty years, the OSCE has issued a number of statements
of principles regarding the protection of minority rights, including the Hague Recommendations
Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations
on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration
of Diverse Societies (2012).58 In documents such as the Charter for European Security, adopted at
the Istanbul summit of 1999, it has also reaffirmed its commitment to “preventing the outbreak of
violent conflicts wherever possible” and “to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged
by war and destruction.”59 Beyond affirming these principles related to human security, the OSCE
has sought to memorialize its operational approach to conflict prevention in documents including
“The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security” (2009) and the Ministerial
Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (2011).60
Scholars disagree about the efficacy of the OSCE’s efforts to transform norms governing
relations among diverse ethnic groups in Eurasia. Some observers, such as Wolfgang Zellner, have
argued that the HCNM has been relatively successful in “de-securitizing” relationships between
states and minority groups by “introducing international minority rights standards as the frame
of reference for majority, minority and kin-States.” The HCNM, Zellner asserts, has facilitated
“substantive short-term solutions with a view towards sustainable long-term solutions under local
ownership.”61 Others have taken a more skeptical view: David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy
contend that “the HCNM’s role in societal security often appears to maintain the status quo ‘state
vs. minority’ logic of the European minority rights regime,” and that the OSCE as a whole has been
unable to transform the “zero-sum context” of interethnic relations in Eurasia.62
Despite the sometimes disappointing results of its conflict prevention and crisis management
initiatives, the OSCE remains a vital component of the Eurasian security architecture, both because
of its inclusive membership structure and because of its core mission to advance “common and
comprehensive security” through a consensus-based approach. Yet, for the organization to play
a robust role in addressing the urgent security challenges in contemporary Eurasia, it is essential
that its participating States share a genuine consensus about the importance of protecting civilians
threatened by violent conflict.
One stumbling block to productive cooperation between the Eastern and Western participating
States of the OSCE has been mutual suspicion over the other side’s motives. In Zellner’s words,
“what the U.S. regards as democratization, Russia takes as destabilization.”63 As Alistair Miskimmon
and Ben O’Loughlin have observed, a profound misalignment has emerged between Russian and
57

Thors, Address to the 1102nd Plenary Meeting, 2-10.

58

Ibid., 13-16; Jennifer Jackson-Preece, “The High Commissioner on National Minorities as a Normative Actor,” Journal
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 12, no. 3 (2013), 77-82; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe, High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in InterState Relations & Explanatory Note (Vienna: OSCE, June 2008); Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe,
High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory
Note (Vienna: OSCE, November 2012).

59

Quoted in Nilsson, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 176.

60

Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Conflict Prevention Centre, The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive
and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones (Vienna: OSCE, June 17, 2009, OSCE Doc. SEC.GAL/100/09);
Ackermann, Forty Years, 46-47.

61

Wolfgang Zellner, “Working without Sanctions: Factors Contributing to the (Relative) Effectiveness of the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 12, no. 3 (2013), 30. See
also Knut Vollebaeck, “The Challenge of Diversity: Is Integration an Answer?” Security and Human Rights 21, no. 3
(2010), 213-219; Franzisca Zanker, “Integration as Conflict Prevention: Possibilities and Limitations in the experience
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” Security and Human Rights 21, no. 3 (2010), 220-232.

62

David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy, “European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe: On Transforming the
Securitization Dynamic,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012), 274, 281.

63

Wolfgang Zellner, “Managing Change in Europe: Evaluating the OSCE and its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities,
and Missions,” CORE Working Paper 13 (Hamburg: Center for OSCE Research, 2005), 13; see also Dunay, The OSCE in
Crisis, 73.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1505

Assessing the Record of the OSCE

71

Western narratives about the post-Cold War order. Rather than being recognized as “co-constitutor
of this emerging system,” since the early 1990s “Russia has complained of being excluded from
the major decisions affecting it.” Consequently, Russia “feels mis-recognized,” driving a “cycle of
miscommunication, generating frustration on all sides and restricting the scope for cooperation.”64
During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE explicitly avoided establishing a democratization agenda,
which the Western participating States recognized as a bridge too far for their Soviet counterparts.
Instead, participants in the Helsinki dialogue process focused on promotion of human rights and
other aspects of the “human dimension” of security, in an effort to build mutual trust and lay a
foundation for a broader range of security cooperation activities.
In the current period of retrenchment in relations between NATO and the Russian Federation,
it is essential for the OSCE to seek areas of common ground that can serve as a focal point for
constructive engagement. A narrowing and deepening of the OSCE’s mission, refocusing on the
objectives of promoting human security in regions afflicted by conflict, might help rebuild the
normative consensus between Eastern and Western participating States and increase the OSCE’s
operational effectiveness.
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